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Abstract 
The corporate bankruptcy is a significant problem for economy since it is considered 
as a limiting factor for economic growth. The financial crisis that broke out in USA 
on 2007 as a result of miscalculated subprime mortgage strategies turn into a full 
international banking crisis affecting successively the European banks, especially 
those of South European countries. Given that the role and the impact of the banks in 
the national and international economies are significant , it is vital for all interested 
economy stakeholders to constantly assess and measure the financial health of banks 
by use of reliable bankruptcy prediction models. 
This work includes a literature review of known prediction models for firm 
bankruptcy which are based on multivariate discriminant analysis. Additionally, it 
presents the findings of the empirical study implemented by use of Altman’s Z-score 
model specialized for firms from emerging markets. The main tasks carried out were: 
 Financial data analysis for “failed” banks located mostly in South European 
countries (GIIPS group)  
 Application of  the above analysis outcome to benchmark the financial status 
of Central European banks that are still active 
The aim of this work was to examine the effectiveness and accuracy of Altman's Z-
score model for measuring the financial health of banking sector organizations and 
answer the research question whether Altman’s specialized formula, for firms from 
emerging markets, could be used for banking sector organizations too.   
The findings of the empirical study, allows someone to claim that the accuracy and 
predictability of the tested Altman Z-score model, specialized for firms from 
emerging markets, is questionable as regards predictions for private firms operating 
with high leverage. 
Keywords: European banks, financial health, prediction models, multivariate 
discriminant analysis, Z- score model , Altman 
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Introduction  
The financial crisis that broke out in USA on 2007 as a result of miscalculated 
subprime mortgage strategies turn into a full international banking crisis affecting 
successively the banks in Europe as well. Some European banks with high exposure 
on the American banking system were directly affected and brought to the brink of 
collapse. However, this was not the only reason for bank collapsing. A plethora of 
additional reasons contributed in this as well i.e. inefficient fiscal policies of European 
countries for consecutive years, overloaded public sector that did not correspond to 
the real country’s needs etc. In Greece, a sovereign national debt in conjunction to the 
impact of the international financial crisis put in troubles many banks.   
Several Greek banks were exposed to the threat of a "disorderly bankruptcy" as a bi-
effect of the policies of non-cautious lending activity and the over-investment in the 
past years. The lack of crucial funds for these banks imposed the need of an urgent 
recapitalization of them. The Greek government was surprised and reacted gradually 
to this by taking a series of measures (bail-out programme) in order to avoid a 
collapse of the Greek banking system that could lead to chaotic situation with 
tremendous economic and social consequences for the country.  
Undoubtedly, the role and the impact of banks in the social-economic life of any 
country are of great significance and this applies for Greece too. Therefore their 
financial health is matter of great concern for all involved to financial activities and 
finance researchers as well.  
This work aimed to check if it is possible to measure and predict the financial health 
of banks in an efficient and reliable way.  
Inspiration about choosing this research topic was the collapse threat that Greek banks 
faced when the Eurozone crisis broke out. According to my point of view, if there 
were effective predicting tools for corporate default which could also be used in the 
banking sector too, it would be a significant tool for European governments in their 
decision making. These would be able to immediately react and take appropriate 
mitigation measures for their economies which in combination with assistance from 
the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund could keep off 
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upcoming default of European banks and consequently avoid their catastrophic effects 
on the social-economic life of the European countries affected. 
Research objectives and tasks 
Based on the fact that the banking sector could be considered as a service sector 
organisation which plays a crucial role in development of the economy, both on 
national and international level, it is always challenging and valuable to measure the 
financial health of banks, especially on economic recession time. 
First objective of this work is to present known prediction models for the 
measurement of firm financial health. Special focus is given on those of multivariate 
discriminant analysis which are commonly used by many finance researchers and 
professionals. The second objective, the main one, was to test and evaluate the 
strength and accuracy of Altman’s Z- score model and its suitability to be used for 
predicting imminent threats of financial distress in banking sector. For that, a data 
sample of European banks was selected which was divided in two target groups.  
In the first group were included banks mainly from countries of South Europe, namely 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain plus Cyprus. Further on, this group will be 
referred to as GIIPS banks or “failed” group. The second was consisted of banks from 
countries of Central Europe, namely Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands and 
Switzerland which will be called as CE banks or “active” group. 
The main tasks of the second objective were: 
 Analysis of financial data of failed banks of GIIPS group by use of the 
Altman’s Z-score specialized for firms from emerging markets 
 Application of the analysis outcome in benchmarking of the financial status of 
CE banks  
in order to examine the effectiveness and accuracy of Altman's Z-score in measuring 
the financial health of banking sector organizations and answer the research question 
whether Altman’s specialized formula for emerging markets could be used for 
banking sector organizations too.   
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Literature review 
Risks faced by financial institutions  
According to organisation theory, any organisation is confronted with many different 
risks during its whole life. Financial institutions are characterized as organizations of 
the service sector. Their role and impact in the social-economic life of countries is 
significant and multifarious. They are evolved in different financial activities like 
lending, asset management, deposit keeping etc. which means that these are exposed 
to different kind of risks explained below. The financial health of banks reflects to the 
economy of a country and in some cases of the whole world. The most crucial risks 
faced by banks are outlined in the below table: 
Risk type Event 
Systemic risk 
A default by one financial institution may possibly 
create a “ripple effect” that leads to defaults by other 
financial institutions and threatens the stability of the 
financial system. (Hull, 2015, p.326) 
Credit risk 
The possibility that a bank borrower or counterparty 
will fail to meet its payment obligations regarding 
the terms agreed with the bank (GARP, 2014, p. 14). 
Market risk 
The risk of losses in on and off-balance sheet 
positions arising from adverse movements in market 
prices (EBA, 2017). 
Operational risk 
The risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people, and systems or from 
external events. This definition includes legal risk 
but excludes strategic and reputational risk (BIS, 
2011). 
Liquidity risk 
The possibility that over a specific horizon the bank 
will become unable to settle obligations. (Drehmann, 
M. and Nikolaou, 2010, p.1). 
Table 2: Crucial risks faced by banks  
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When a bank cannot repay and meet its economic obligations to its investors, lenders 
and generally to its stakeholders then reaches a default situation or in other words it 
becomes in a ‘failed condition”. If corrective measures are not taken or are incorrect 
then the bank's problematic situation can result to a disorderly bankruptcy with 
chaotic consequences in every aspect of the social-economic life of the country that 
the bank is operating.  
In order to predict and avoid bank failure situations and their subsequent economic 
disaster a regulatory framework for banking sector was necessary to be established. 
Hull (2015) pointed out the importance of regulations in order to avoid bank failing. 
He justified this need and explained that “…main purpose of bank regulation is to 
ensure that a bank keeps enough capital for the risks it takes. It is not possible to 
eliminate altogether the possibility of a bank failing, but governments want to make 
the probability of default for any given bank very small. By doing this, they want to 
create a stable economic environment where private individuals and businesses have 
confidence in the banking system” (Hull, 2015, p. 325).  
On 1974, G10 countries represented by their central bank Governors and the monetary 
authorities of Luxembourg, Switzerland and Spain formed the Committee of Banking 
Regulations and Supervisory Practices. The main goal of this Committee, which 
convened in Basel of Switzerland, was to strengthen financial stability worldwide by 
setting common principles that all financial institutions should follow and be 
supervised for. Nowadays, the Basel Committee has expanded its membership from 
the G10 to 45 institutions from 28 jurisdictions. (BIS, 2017; Culp, 2015).  
A document entitled “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards” was the main outcome of Basel Committee. This was referred to as “The 
1988 BIS Accord" and was the first attempt to set international risk-based standards 
for capital adequacy (Culp, 2015). Later on it became known as Basel I and paved the 
way for significant increases in the resources banks devote to measuring, 
understanding, and managing risks. The key innovation in the 1988 was a measure, 
for assessing the bank total credit exposure, named Cooke ratio. Hull (2015) clarifies 
the components of this measure by explaining that “The Cooke ratio considers credit 
risk exposures that are both on balance-sheet and off balance-sheet. It is based on 
what is known as the banks total risk-weighted assets.” (p. 327). 
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Since several issues remained still unsettled, i.e. there was not developed any model 
of default correlation, two more Accords were published Basel II and Basel III, 
establishing a series of international standards concerning mostly the capital 
adequacy. 
The Basel II capital requirements applied to “international active” banks. In Europe, 
all banks were regulated under Basel II but in the United decided States the regulatory 
authorities decided that Basel II would not apply to small regional banks (Hull, 2015, 
pp. 336-337). The Basel II is based on the following three “pillars”: 
1. Minimum Capital Requirements
2. Supervisory Review
3. Market Discipline
Following the 2007-2009 credit crisis, the Basel committee realized that 
improvements on Basel II were necessary. Capital requirements needed to sufficiently 
cover not only market risk but credit risk as well. Additionally, it was considered that 
the definition of capital had to be tightened and that regulations were needed to 
address liquidity risk (BIS, 2017; Hull 2015). The final version of the Basel III 
regulations was published in December 2010 and settled issues about: 
1. Capital Definition and Requirements
2. Capital Conservation Buffer
3. Countercyclical Buffer
4. Leverage Ratio
5. Counterparty Credit Risk
The establishment of a series of international standards for bank regulation 
contributed not only to enhancement of financial stability by improving the quality of 
banking supervision worldwide but facilitated also the availability of financial data for 
research. More specifically, all type of organizations are obliged to prepare and 
provide on an annual basis, specifically processed information about their operation, 
which are stored in various databases. This information is considered as credible and 
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is provided in standard formats which means that someone can easily access and 
process it. Subsequently, the testing of any model proposed for financial analysis 
purposes can be easily supplied with credible and homogenous data which was the 
case for the empirical study of this work too. 
Financial Distress and Corporate Bankruptcy 
The early prediction of financial distress is essential for investors or lending 
institutions who wish to protect their financial investments. As a consequence, 
modeling, prediction and classification of firms to determine whether these are 
potential candidates for financial distress have become key topics of debate and 
detailed research. Financial distress is defined as “… a condition where a company 
cannot meet, or has difficulty paying off its official obligations to its creditors. The 
chance of financial distress increases when a firm has high fixed costs, illiquid assets 
or revenues sensitive to economic downturns” (Sofat and Hiro, 2015, p. 406).  
One of the major concerns in the specific research area is the lack of consensus on the 
definition of the corporate failure and the financial distress. Several scientists are 
using the term bankruptcy instead of the previous two. Moreover Muller et al. (2012) 
denote that there are also researchers which define financial distress as mergers, 
absorptions, delisting or liquidations or major structural changes to the company.  
For this study purposes, financial distress is regarded as a prior step before bankruptcy 
therefore a timely prediction of financial status might actuate the assessed firm to 
react and take corrective measures and potentially avoid its oncoming bankruptcy. 
However, a financially unhealthy firm may not mandatory be bankrupt but to be 
merged with others, acquired by another etc. In these cases, the firm could be 
considered as a failed one. 
From 1930, several theories, models and techniques were proposed by researchers 
aiming to predict whether a firm is about to face bankruptcy (Bellovary et al. 2007). 
Each of them proposed his/her own formula but in several occasions these are using 
similar financial data and ratios in order to calculate indicators and results. Nowadays, 
there exist a plethora of methods and models available for measuring and assessing 
the financial distress or bankruptcy of firms. 
9 
Historically, corporate bankruptcy was first modeled, classified and predicted by 
Beaver in 1966. He defined financial distress as bankruptcy, insolvency, liquidation 
for the benefit of a creditor, firms which defaulted on loan obligations or firms that 
missed preferred dividend payments. In his research compared the mean values of 30 
ratios of 79 failed and 79 non-failed firms in 38 industries but also tested the 
individual ratios' predictive abilities in classifying bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. 
Actually he tested separately ratios of a) Net Income to Total Debt b) Net Income to 
Sales c) Net Income to Net Worth d) Cash Flow to Total Debt and e) Cash Flow to 
Total Assets with high accuracy results for all ratios. He came to conclusion that cash 
flow to debt ratio was the single best indicator of bankruptcy (Beaver, 1966a; Muller 
et al., 2012) and suggested that if multiple ratios considered simultaneously, in future 
research, might have higher predictive ability than single ratios (Bellovary et al., 
2007).  
More specifically, Beaver (1966b) developed the first parametric model for corporate 
bankruptcy and his kind of analysis was characterized as univariate (Fitzpatrick, 1932; 
Horrigan, 1965). Prediction models that came up afterwards were categorized either 
as parametric or non-parametric. Accordingly, the evolution of the next generation of 
bankruptcy prediction models was based on the concept of firm classification in failed 
non-failed respectively. 
Recently Cybinski (2001) claimed that there is no clear distinction between "failed" 
and "non-failed" firms and all of them are rather laying on a common continuum of 
failed and non-failed. She argued that in reality there is not an obvious cut-off point 
between "failed" and "non-failed" firms but rather an overlap or grey area between 
these two classification groups. According Cybinski, it is quite difficult to accomplish 
predictions of financial distress for firms belonging to this grey area (Cybinski, 2001; 
Muller et al., 2012).  
Besides univariate models another kind of prediction models, the so called 
multivariate models, came in use a few years later. A multivariate model can be 
characterized as discriminant analysis or multi discriminant analysis (MDA) (Altman, 
1968; Altman 1993, Altman, 2000). The evolution of MDA models came with 
probability models like Probit and Logit or Ohlson’s model (1980).  
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An interesting overview of bankruptcy predictions from 1930 to 2002 is provided by 
Bellovary, Giacomino, and Akers (2007). 
MDA analysis  
Discriminant analysis is a statistical technique for distinguishing between two or 
more groups on the basis of their observed and measured characteristics. For example, 
an analyst might take multiple factors into account, such as different financial ratios, 
when choosing between stocks in order to design an efficient portfolio. 
Fischer (1936) used the term discriminant analysis in the article "The Use of Multiple 
Measurement in Taxonomic Problems". The method was applied for exploration of 
the relationship between a group of independent characters (discriminators) and one 
qualitative dependent variable-output. This output could be in simple cases 0 or 1 
allowing the classification of the analysed objects either to first or the second class. 
The classes are known to be clearly distinguishable and each object clearly belongs to 
one of them. The task can also be identification of features that contribute to the 
identification process. The purpose is to find a prediction model classifying new 
objects (for example firms, financial institutions, banks etc) into classes. New objects 
are classified into classes based on their high degree of similarity.  
According to the numbers of variations of qualitative variable one might distinguish:  
• discriminant analysis for two groups, 
• discriminant analysis for more groups. 
Discriminant analysis method is applied in classification problems of many research 
fields. For example in financing area, a bank can monitor in the sample used its 
client’s way of repaying their loans and some other indicators. Subsequently on this 
basis, the bank may evaluate potential clients (based on same characteristics with 
those of the sample) as more or less credible for a loan. 
The main task of discriminant analysis is to find the optimal attributing rules that will 
minimize the likelihood of erroneous classification of elements, i.e. it will minimize 
the median of erroneous decision (it may happen that an element actually comes from 
a particular group but it is classified into different group by obtained discriminant 
analysis). Each element is characterized by several features which reflect its 
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properties. This means that the examined elements (units) are realizations of the 
random vector X = (X1, X2,.., Xn). Random variables Xi, where i = 1, 2,.., m, 
corresponding to measured characteristics (Kočišová & Mišanková, 2014). 
Altman’s prediction models  
The corporate bankruptcy is considered as an especially important problem for 
economy since it is considered as a limiting factor for the economic growth. The first 
research work on multivariate analysis of corporate bankruptcy prediction began in 
1968 with the famous model of Altman and is going on until now with a variety of 
models both statistical and theoretical. The first attempt to build a model that predicts 
the likelihood of bankruptcy of a firm was made by Edward Altman. 
In 1968, Altman (1968) developed and presented the Z-score formula in order to 
provide a more effective financial assessment tool to assist risk analysts and lenders in 
their estimations. His work was based on the notion that univariate prediction models 
served in most cases as indicators and not as predictors of bankruptcy. For that reason, 
these models were not good enough for the actual needs of the financial analysts. He 
used instead, multi discriminant analysis since this allowed the use of a model which 
could treat binary variables as depended in order to explain the behaviour of two 
different groups.  
The method of multiple distinct analysis (MDA) was initially used to classify or to 
make predictions in problems where the dependent variable is displayed in high 
quality formats such as male or female, bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy etc. The main 
advantage of the method is the simultaneous analysis of financial indicators that have 
been chosen while as a downside is highlighted from the literature the violation of 
normality and independence of variables. 
By that time multi-discriminant analysis was used merely by behavioural and 
biological sciences (Altman, 1968). 
Altman introduced two types of errors for testing of final results which are presented 
in the below table. 
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Error Type Occurrence 
I. 
Error occurs when a bankrupt firm has a z-
score that classifies it as non-bankrupt. 
II. 
The exact opposite, namely when a non-
bankrupt firm’s Z-score is beneath 1.81.  
Table 3: Error types for Altman’s model  
The results of Altman’s model test indicated that bankruptcy could be predicted with 
an accuracy of 95% one year before it happened, 72% two years before, 48% three 
years before, 29% four years before and 36% five years before it happens (Altman, 
1993). 
Later Altman revised his model to incorporate a “four variable Z-Score” prediction 
model (Altman, 1993). The new one improved further the predictive ability of his 
original model. Altman (2000, 2002) came repeatedly forward with several revisions 
of this model seeking to make it available to different economic life conditions and to 
advance its prediction accuracy figures. 
The Altman’s model from its publication since now has been of great concern to the 
scientific community. Many variants of it have been proposed trying either 
improvements or adjustments/modifications for use in specailized cases. Variant 
models are considered the linear Probability Model and the Quadratic Discriminant 
Analysis. An outline of the most known variants comes on the following pages. 
Nevertheless the worldwide acceptance of Altman’s model, there exist researchers 
that have expressed their concern regarding the effectiveness of the discriminant 
analysis in financial predictions. Eisenbeis (1977), Ohlson (1980), Jones (1987) were 
critics of MDA and they argued that the results could be biased and did not have 
sufficient information value. The lack of qualitative variables and the inability for 
integration of modern analysis techniques were also pointed out as undermining 
elements of the method efficiency (Zopounidis, 1995). 
Despite of criticizing arguments, financial analysts and scientists are still considering 
Altman’s Z-Score as an effective and suitable indicator of a firm's ability to avoid 
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bankruptcy. All over the world, financial and credit professionals are constantly using 
Altman's models in order to mitigate risk in debt portfolios. It is quite popular because 
it uses multiple variables to measure the financial health and credit worthiness of 
anyone (person or firm). Since Z-score is an open system, the variables employed in 
the formula can easily be understood by its users.  
As aforementioned, the Z-score model was initially developed for publicly held 
manufacturing firms with assets of more than $1 million. Over the years, Altman 
revised its model in order to be applicable to privately held firms (the Altman Z'-
Score) and non-manufacturing firms (the Altman Z"-Score). Altman's Z-score 
formulas are used in a variety of contexts and countries.  
Z-score formula 
The formula uses a statistical technique known as multiple discriminant analysis 
(MDA), by which Altman attempted to predict defaults by use of the following five 
accounting ratios (Hayes et al., 2010; Hull, 2015, p. 400): 
X1: Working Capital/Total Assets  
X2: Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
X3: Earnings before interest and taxes/Total Assets 
X4: Market value of equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities 
X5: Sales/Total Assets 
Depending on the nature of the enterprises assessed the Z-score formula varies 
(Altman, 1968; Altman, 1977; Altman, 1993; Altman, 2000). In case of publicly 
traded manufacturing companies (general formula) the original Z-score is:  
 Z=1.2*X1+1.4*X2+3.3*X3+0.6*X4+0.999*X5 (1) 
While, in the predictions for non-manufacturing firms (not applicable for banks & 
finance companies), the calculation formula uses only four variables and becomes 
(Altman, 1977, p. 22; Chotalia, 2014): 
 Z=6.56*X1+3.26*X2+6.72*X3+1.05*X4 (2) 
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Respectively, for companies from emerging markets (banks) the calculation formula 
takes the following form: 
  Z=6.56*X1+3.26*X2+6.72*X3+1.05*X4+3.26 (3) 
Variable 
name 
Ratio of  Result to be achieved 
X1 
Working Capital / Total 
Assets (WC/TA)  
 
This ratio measures the net working capital 
relative to the size of the assets used in the 
business. It is used as a measure of liquidity 
standardized by the size of the firm. 
X2 
Retained Earnings / Total 
Assets (RE/TA)  
 
This variable relates the total retained 
earnings of the firm to the total assets 
employed. It is able to capture the 
cumulative profitability of the firm since 
inception. Also, since young firms tend to 
have low RE/TA ratios, this variable may 
capture the age of the firm as well.  
X3 
Earnings Before Interest 
and Taxes / Total Assets 
(EBIT/TA)  
 
The operating profitability in relation to 
total assets measures the productivity of the 
assets or the earning power.  
X4 
Market Value Equity / 
Book Value of Total 
Liabilities (MVE/TL) 
This ratio measures the extent to which 
total assets can decline in value before total 
liabilities exceed book value of equity. In 
other words, this indicates the asset cushion 
of the firm.1  
                                                            
1 X4*, Book Value Equity / Book Value of Total Liabilities (BE/TL)  
This alternative ratio for X4 variable is appropriate for a firm that is not publicly traded, and hence the 
Z-model with this variable definition is called the Z’-model or the private firm model.  
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X5 
Sales / Total Assets 
(S/TA)  
 
This asset turnover ratio is intended to 
capture the sales generating ability of the 
assets.  
Altman found this to be industry sensitive 
and least discriminating between the 
bankrupt and non-bankrupt companies. As 
a result, Altman proposed a variant of the 
Z’-model called the Z”-model which 
excludes S/TA. 
Table 4: Variables and ratios used in Altman's Z-score models 
In the table below is presented a classification of Z-score cutoffs proposed from 
Altman for his models. There exist three zones (or credit ratings) that a firm might be 
classified depending on the Z-score achieved after its assessment. These zones are 
safe, gray and distress and their low and upper limits vary depending on the model 
version used. 
Zone 
Model Safe Gray Distress 
Z (original model) >2.99 2.99-1.80 <1.80 
Z (emerging markets  model) >2.60 2.60-1.10 <1.10 
Table 5: A classification of Z-score cutoffs  
Grover’s model  
Grover model is a model that is generated by performing redesign and reassessment of 
the Altman Z-Score model. Grover Model does categorize bankruptcy with a G-score 
of less than or equal to -0.02 (G≤-0.02) while the state does not go bankrupt more 
than or equal to 0.01 (G≥0.01) (Grover, 2003).  
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Grover's	formula	  
 where: 
CAR = α + β1*X1 + β2 *X3 + β3*ROA + ɛ  
	
CAR: Capital Adequacy Ratio  
X1: working capital/ total assets  
X3: earnings before interest and 
taxes/ total assets  
ROA: net income/ total assets 
Springate’s model 
Springate model follows procedures developed by Altman. In 1978, Springate used 
step-wise multiple discriminant analysis to select four out of 19 popular financial 
ratios that best distinguished sound firms from those that failed (Vickers, 2006, p. 67).  
Actually, the applied formula classifies a firm with S-score> 0,862 as a company that 
is healthy and there is no potential to be bankrupt, and vice versa. In simple words, the 
lower score is the greater probability for default becomes. The specific model 
examines insufficient liquidity, excess debt, insufficient sales and lack of profit 
(Sands et al. 1983; Sadgrove, 2006, p. 178). 
Springate's	formula	  
 where: 
CAR= α + β1*A + β2*B + β3 *C + β4 *D+ ɛ  
CAR: Capital Adequacy Ratio  
A: Working Capital/ Total Assets  
B: Net profit before interest and 
Taxes/ Total Assets  
C: Net profit before taxes/ Current 
Liabilities  
D: Sales / Total Assets 
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Ohlson’s model  
Ohlson proposed the O-score as a more effective statistical bankruptcy indicator 
generated from a set of nine independent balance sheet ratios (Ohlson, 1980). He 
applied Logit model which was based on the same assumptions as MDA. Financial 
data of over 2000 companies were processed to feed the model scaling factors applied 
to its nine variables with the aim of increasing its accuracy. Its main 
difference/advantage from Altman’s model is the sample size since its assessment 
process is based on a much larger sample of corporate successes and failures in order 
to inform the model. 
Ohlson's	formula	  
 where: 
CAR = α + β1SIZE+ β2TLTA+ β3WCTA 
+ β4CLCA + β5OENEG+β6NITA + 
β7FUTL+β7INTWO+β7CHIN+ɛ  
 
CAR: Capital Adequacy Ratio  
SIZE: log (total assets)  
TLTA: total liabilities / total assets 
WCTA: working capital / total assets 
CLCA: current liabilities / current assets 
OENEG: is a dummy variable, 1 if total 
liabilities exceed total assets, and 0 if 
otherwise 
NITA: net income / total assets  
FUTL: funds provided by operations / 
total liabilities 
INTWO: is a dummy variable, it would 
be worth 1 if negative net income for at 
least two years in a row, and 0 if not  
CHIN: (NIt-(NIt-1))/(│NIt│+│NIt-1│), 
where NIt is the net income for all 
periods. 
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Zmijewski's Model  
Zmijewski model (1984) used ratio analysis that measures the performance, leverage 
and liquidity of a firm for the model predictions in order to predict a firm's bankruptcy 
in two years (X-score). The analysis applied by Zmijewski used 40 firms that have 
gone bankrupt and 800 firms that were still on business at that time. Zmijewski model 
assessment criteria is the greater the value of X (exceeding 0), the more likely the firm 
could be bankrupt. On the contrary, if a firm gets a score of less than zero then the 
firm will not potentially bankrupt (Zmijewski, 1984). 
Zmijewski’s	formula	  
 where: 
CAR = α + β1*X1 +β2* X2 + β3*X3 + ɛ  
  
	
CAR: Capital Adequacy Ratio  
X1: ROA (Return on Assets)  
X2: Leverage (Debt Ratio)  
X3: Liquidity (Current Ratio) 
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Empirical Study 
In this section, the sample, data, methodology and results of the empirical study are 
presented.  
As aforementioned, Altman’s Z-Score is considered by many scientists and finance 
professionals as an effective and suitable tool for predicting corporate failures. In 
2013, Altman, Danovi and Falini (2013) applied Z-score model to predict the 
corporate failure of Italian firms subject to extraordinary administration. The results 
of their Z-score application shown a high prediction failure rate (ca. 95%) for the 
firms measured.  
As every model, Altman’s Z-score has pros and cons.  The main advantages are 
(Altman et al., 1995; Altman et al., 2013): 
 High rate of prediction accuracy from its appearance time until now (82%-
94%) 
 User friendliness. Anyone with finance knowledge and statistical skills can 
easily use it. 
 Multi-dimensional use. It is proposed for bankruptcy predictions of every firm 
type (private, publicly listed, non-manufacturing) 
 Availability of strong credit scoring. The Altman Z-score offers a strong credit 
scoring based on the financial data analysis of a sample of firms which might 
be used as a benchmark basis.  
On the other side, its main setbacks are (Eisenbeis, 1977; Ohlson, 1980; Jones 1987; 
Zopounidis, 1995): 
 Inability for modern analysis techniques integration. The Altman Z-score 
initially developed for industrial firms. Its modified versions have to be 
cautiously used in prediction cases for other firm types. 
 Biased results due to data manipulation easiness. There exists possibility of 
manipulation of the accounting statements from the firms in order to show 
good figures. This may lead to wrong conclusions, something that cannot be 
substantiated by Altman Z-score model. 
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The use of Z-score model to predict bank failure has a relatively recent appearance. In 
previous research works, aiming to measure the financial status of banks by use of Z-
score, the specialized Altman’s formula for firms from emerging markets was 
preferred (Chieng, 2013; Chotalia, 2014; Samarakoon and Hasan; 2003). In some 
cases, in the formula used for emerging markets was also included a specific constant 
proposed by Altman et al. (1995), so that the scores equal or less than zero would be 
equivalent to the default situation. The latter is the case for this empirical study too. 
Sample and data 
The data sample consisted of 42 banks which were classified into two groups of 21 
unmatched and randomly categorized banks for each group. In the first one were 
included all “failed” banks and the second contained the “non-failed” or still active 
banks, according to Altman’s model specifications.  
In the so-called “failed” group are included of banks from Greece, Italy, Ireland 
Portugal, Spain and Cyprus. Further on, in this work, these countries will be called as 
GIIPS countries and respectively the banks as GIIPS banks. The “non-failed” group is 
consisted of still active banks from several Central European countries, namely 
Germany, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Switzerland. The last one is not a 
European Union member but it is an associated country to EU and their banks are 
following the rules of Basel (BIS, 2017). For this work purposes, these countries will 
be referred to as CE countries and their banks as CE banks. 
The selection of the banks examined, in this work, is based on specific characteristics 
for each target group. More specifically, for the group of GIIPS “failed” banks is their 
status after failure which might be:  
o merged 
o acquired from another bank  
o defaulted 
It is worthy to mention that in the European Union does not exist any authorized 
association to keep certified, valid and accessible records of the “failed” European 
banks (merged, defaulted, acquired). On the contrary, in United States there exists an 
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authority named Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) which is monitoring, 
collecting and providing such information. 
For the above reason, the selection and grouping of failed banks was a difficult and 
time-consuming task which was accomplished with personal search and processing of 
raw data from financial statements, documents etc. One of the set criteria was that the 
failure event had to been occurred during the years of the financial crisis (2006-2016). 
Another one was that these banks would have their headquarters to someone of the so-
called GIIPS countries. 
“Failed” group (GIIPS banks)  Year of “failure” 
1. Proton Bank S.A. (Greece) 2011 
2. Marfin Egnatia Bank S.A. (Greece) 2011 
3. Geniki Bank S.A. (Greece) 2014 
4. Millenium Bank (Greece) 2013 
5. Banca di Credito Cooperativo di Sagna S.C.(Italy) 2010 
6. Valore Italia Holding di Partecipazioni S.p.A.(Italy) 2015 
7. Cassa Rurale ed Artigiana di Treviso Credito Cooperativo (Italy) 2015 
8. Banca Agricola di Mantovana S.p.A.(Italy) 2007 
9. Banca Antonoveta (Italy) 2007 
10. Bancaperta S.p.A. (Italy) 2008 
11. Banco di Sicilia S.p.A (Italy) 2006 
12. Credito Artigiano S.p.A (Italy) 2012 
13. Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Limited(Ireland) 2013 
14. Banco BIC Portugues S.A. (Portugal) 2010 
15. Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co Ltd 2012 
16. Caixa d Estalvis de Catalunya Tarragona I Manresa (Spain) 2012 
17. Banca Civica S.A. (Spain) 2012 
18. Banco de Andalucia S.A. (Spain) 2009 
19. Banco de Valencia S.A. (Spain) 2013 
20. Banco Espanol de Credito S.A. (Spain) 2013 
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21. Banco Pastor S.A. (Spain) 2011 
Table 6: “Failed” group members (GIIPS banks)  
Respectively, for the banks comprising the non-failed group of CE banks, the 
characteristics applied were the following: 
o still active 
o large in terms of assets (ranking list www.relbanks.com) 
o located in countries of Central Europe which were not severely affected by the 
recent economic crisis of Eurozone. 
On the basis of the above criteria, there were selected 3-6 large banks from each 
country of the CE group.  
“Non-failed” group (CE active banks) 
1. AXA Bank Belgium N.V. 
2. Belfius Banque S.A. (Belgium) 
3. ING Belgium S.A. 
4. BNP Paribas S.A. (ENXTPA:BNP) (France) 
5. BPCE S.A. (France) 
6. Credit Agricole S.A. (France) 
7. Bayerische Landesbank (Germany) 
8. Commerzbank AG (Germany) 
9. Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft (DB:DBK) (Germany) 
10. Kfw (ASX:KFWHZ) (Germany) 
11. Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg (Germany) 
12. de Volksbank N.V. (Netherlands) 
13. Achmea B.V. (Netherlands) 
14. ABN Amro Bank N.V. (Netherlands) 
15. NIBC bank N.V. (Netherlands) 
16. ING Bank N.V. (Netherlands) 
17. Credit Suisse AG (Switzerland) 
18. Banque Cantonale Vaudoise (SWX:BCVN) (Switzerland) 
19. UBS AG (Switzerland) 
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20. Raiffeisen Schweiz Genossenschaft (Switzerland) 
21. Zurcher Kantonalbank (Switzerland) 
Table 7: “Non-failed” group members (CE banks)  
Methodology  
The financial health assessment of the banks examined was performed by use of the 
statistical Altman’s specialized model for firms from emerging markets. More 
specifically, the following Z- score formula was applied to the data analysis 
performed (Altman et al., 1995):  
Z = 6.56X1 + 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 + 1.05X4 +3.26  
Where:  
Z = the score 
X = the independent variables (ratios of) 
X1: Working Capital/Total Assets  
X2: Retained Earnings/Total Assets  
X3: EBIT/Total Assets  
X4: Book Value Equity/Total liabilities  
All financial data to calculate the needed ratios for the formula application were 
extracted from balance sheets and income statements of the sample banks. These were 
accessed and retrieved via the S&P Capital IQ platform or directly from their 
websites. The date of all financial documents used in this process was the 31st 
December for each year of reference. 
For testing the accuracy and predictability of the model used, the Z-scores for the 
“failed” group members were estimated two years before the known “event” per each 
case. For example, if a bank was merged on 2012, the Z-score was calculated for 
years 2010 and 2011. Thus, the financial status of this bank was based on the average 
of the estimated Z-score for these two years. 
On the contrary, for the “non-failed” group members (still active CE banks) their Z-
score was explicitly estimated for years 2015 and 2016. Consequently, their financial 
soundness was characterized on the basis of the calculated average of Z-score. 
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Actually, the financial status of the banks examined was characterized depending on 
which of the following zones was laying their calculated Z-score average, namely if it 
was: 
o above 2.6 – The bank was sorted in the “Safe” zone  
o between 1.1 to 2.6 – The bank was sorted in the “Grey zone” 
o less than 1.1 or had a negative number – The bank was sorted in the “Distress 
zone” 
Financial data analysis and results 
The following table displays the outcome of the Z-score analysis implemented for the 
“failed” group (GIIPS banks). The final Z-score result (second column) is the average 
of the Z-scores of the last two years before the “failed” event (which varies depending 
on each bank case).  
 
“Failed” group 
Banks of GIIPS countries  
Z-score Result 
(Average of two 
years before the 
“failed” event) 
Estimated status  (zone) 
1. Proton Bank S.A. (Greece) -0.21 Distress 
2. Marfin Egnatia Bank S.A. 
(Greece) -1.06 Distress 
3. Geniki Bank S.A. (Greece) -2.01 Distress 
4. Millenium Bank (Greece) -3.92 Distress 
5. Banca di Credito Cooperativo di 
Sagna S.C.(Italy) 2.34 Grey 
6. Valore Italia Holding di 
Partecipazioni S.p.A.(Italy) -2.36 Distress 
7. Cassa Rurale ed Artigiana di 
Treviso Credito Cooperativo (Italy) -0.18 Distress 
8. Banca Agricola di Mantovana  
S.p.A.(Italy) 0.05 Distress 
9. Banca Antonoveta (Italy) 1.37 Grey 
10. Bancaperta S.p.A. (Italy) 4.51 Safe 
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11. Banco di Sicilia S.p.A (Italy) 0.16 Distress 
12. Credito Artigiano S.p.A (Italy) -0.63 Distress 
13. Irish Bank Resolution 
Corporation Limited (Ireland) -4.38 Distress 
14. Banco BIC Portugues S.A. 
(Portugal) 0.73 Distress 
15. Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co 
Ltd -0.46 Distress 
16. Caixa d Estalvis de Catalunya 
Tarragona I Manresa (Spain) -0.80 Distress 
17. Banca Civica S.A. (Spain) -0.32 Distress 
18. Banco de Andalucia S.A. 
(Spain) -1.44 Distress 
19. Banco de Valencia S.A. (Spain) -1.29 Distress 
20. Banco Espanol de Credito S.A. 
(Spain) 0.03 Distress 
21. Banco Pastor S.A. (Spain) -0.26 Distress 
Table 8: Characterization of failed banks after Z-score analysis 
In the first subgroup of GIIPS banks, the Z-score outcome of all Greek banks 
examined (Proton Bank, Marfin Bank, Egnatia Bank, Geniki Bank, Millenium Bank) 
was negative. This could be interpreted as that these specific banks were in difficult 
financial situation and their calculated Z-scores correctly predicted the upcoming 
“financial distress” that they were confronted with in the next years. 
More specifically, Proton Bank was liquidated and merged on 2001, Egnatia Bank 
was acquired on 2011, Geniki Bank acquired on 2014, and Millenium Bank with a 
significant negative Z-score (-3.92). 
A significant factor determining their final Z-score was the large negative liquidity 
ratio X1 (Working Capital /Total Assets) based on the fact that Current Lialibilities 
over-exceed the Current Assets for calculating Working Capital. For further details 
see appendixes I and II. 
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Italian banks composed the second subgroup. This was consisted of 8 banks which on 
the basis of their calculated Z-score were sorted as follows: five in the “Distress 
zone”, two in Grey zone and the last one in “Safe zone”. Again Z-score proved its 
high precision and effectiveness acting as distress indicator Banca di Credito 
Cooperativo (2.34) was acquired on 2010, Valore Italia Holding (-2.36) acquired on 
2015, Cassa Rurale ed Artigiana (-0.18) acquired on 2015, Banca Agricola (0.05) was 
acquired on 2007, Banka Antonoveta (1.37) was acquired on 2007, Banco di Sicilia 
(0.16) merged on 2006, and Credito Artigiano (-0.63) acquired on 2012. The 
Bancaperta Spa with 4.51 final Z-score (Safe Zone) was a positive exception that 
merged with another bank by acquiring it.  
The third subgroup of banks was from Spain. It was consisted from 6 small banks. 
The whole sample from Spain was classified to the “Distress zone” due to the 
negative Z-scores achieved. In this case too, the significant factor of a very high 
negative liquidity ratio due to over-exceeding current liabilities to current assets 
determined the final outcome. Caixa d Estalvis de Catalanya (-0.8) acquired on 2012, 
Banca Civica (-0.32) acquired on 2012, Banco de Andalucia (-1.44) acquired on 2009, 
Banco de Valencia (-1.29) acquired-merged on 2013, Banco Espanol de Credito 
(0.033) acquired on 2013, and Banco Pastor (-0.26) acquired-merged. 
The last subgroup is a multinational one since it incorporates three banks from three 
different European Countries, namely Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus. The Irish Bank 
Resolution had a negative Z-score (-4.38) which was also the highest of the whole 
sample. The result indicated that the bank was in a very bad financial situation which 
later was actually confirmed by the bank’s liquidation on 2013. In this specific case, 
Z-score was significantly affected from the negative Working Capital, the negative 
Retained Earnings and consequently by EBIT. The Portuguese Banco Bic had also a 
low Z-score by which it was classified to the distress zone. Finally, in the case of the 
Cyprus Popular bank, that was defaulted on 2012, the achieved Z-score was a strong 
indication for immerse financial danger.  
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 “Non-failed” group 
Active CE banks 
Z-score Result 
(Average of the Z-
score for 2015 and 
2016) 
Estimated status  
(zone) 
1. AXA Bank Belgium N.V. -0.68 Distress 
2. Belfius Banque S.A. (Belgium) 0.65 Distress 
3. ING Belgium S.A. -0.84 Distress 
4. BNP Paribas S.A. 
(ENXTPA:BNP) (France) 1.60 Grey  
5. BPCE S.A. (France) 1.08 Distress 
6. Credit Agricole S.A. (France) 2.02 Grey  
7. Bayerische Landesbank 
(Germany) 0.73 Distress 
8. Commerzbank AG (Germany) 0.91 Distress 
9. Deutsche Bank Aktienge 
sellschaft (DB:DBK) (Germany) 2.23 Grey 
10. Kfw (ASX:KFWHZ) 
(Germany) 3.42 Safe 
11. Landesbank Baden-
Wurttemberg (Germany) 1.43 Grey 
12. de Volksbank N.V. 
(Netherlands) -1.38 Distress 
13. Achmea B.V. (Netherlands) 2.53 Grey  
14. ABN Amro Bank N.V. 
(Netherlands) -0.72 Distress 
15. NIBC bank N.V. (Netherlands) 2.50 Grey 
16. ING Bank N.V. (Netherlands) -0.91 Distress 
17. Credit Suisse AG (Switzerland) 2.88 Safe 
18. Banque Cantonale Vaudoise 
(SWX:BCVN) (Switzerland) 0.12 Distress 
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Table 9: Financial status estimation of the non-failed banks  
The analysis of the final Z-scores for the “non-failed” or still active banks showed that 
57% of the active Central European banks were sorted in the “Distress’ zone, 33% of 
the rest testing sample was placed to the “Grey zone” and only 10% of banks 
examined could be classified to the “Safe zone”.  
By applying the specialized Z-score formula on the largest banks of Belgium, France, 
Germany, Netherlands and Switzerland and analyzing cautiously the findings, a 
significant limitation of this model was exposed. The specific formula has not a 
proper and accurate performance and respectively predictability in cases of firms 
(here banks) having high leverage (debt). As it was the case with the Z-scores of the 
“failed” banks, it was evidently confirmed here too that the highest was the liquidity 
ratio (with negative value at the same time) due to over-exceed of the current 
liabilities to current assets, the smallest became the estimate of the Z-score. 
 
Figure 1: Z-score estimations per group and zone 
19. UBS AG (Switzerland) 2.13 Grey 
20. Raiffeisen Schweiz 
Genossenschaft (Switzerland) -0.21 Distress 
21. Zurcher Kantonalbank 
(Switzerland) 1.08 Distress 
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Limitations of the empirical study  
The biggest challenge of this work was the model itself and its applicability to 
banking sector organisations. The Z-Altman score was initially developed for 
predicting bankruptcy for industrial firms almost 50 years ago in USA. It is an old 
model which is generally accepted as appropriate for bankruptcy prediction by finance 
experts and researchers. Despite that during all these years, it has undergone a lot of 
improvements and modifications/adjustments in order to be expanded its application 
to all types of firms, it is still presenting some malfunctions.  
The problem lies on the fact that the banks/financial institutions are usually operating 
under conditions of high current liabilities. Consequence of that is the appearance of a 
great negative impact on the first variable X1 (Working Capital/Total Assets) which 
actually affects and reduces the calculated total Z-score of banks under examination.  
In most cases, the current liabilities of banks are exceeding their current assets. 
Therefore, the outcome of Working Capital (Current Assets minus Current Liabilities) 
is always negative for the banks/financial institutions. This liquidity ratio is very 
important for the calculation of Z-score because is helping to screening of serious 
financial problems that a firm could face in the future (Altman, 1995).  
However, a negative Working Capital might be an ambiguous indicator as well. In 
some case, this can be interpreted as a sign of a firm’s managerial efficiency for 
example a firm with low accounts receivable might also mean that it is operates 
effectively on a cash basis (Damodaran, 2012, p. 268; Stockopedia, 2017).  
Another significant limitation for prediction models like Altman’s Z-score is that their 
applicability is principally based on historical information. Eisenbeis (1977) pointed 
out the insufficient value information used in prediction models like Altman’s where 
the prediction of a firm’s future financial status is only based on analysis of past data. 
Economy as life is changing dynamically. According to Grice (2001) “the models’ 
accuracies may significantly decline when using samples from time periods, 
industries, and financial distress situations other than those used to originally develop 
the models” 
Finally, the access to LINC room, where the Bloomberg platform is installed, was not 
possible during the summer time. Therefore, the sole source to retrieve the necessary 
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financial data was S&P Capital Iq platform where balance sheets for a few “failed” 
banks were not available. In these cases, the necessary information was retrieved from 
financial statements and documents uploaded on the bank websites.  
Therefore, a cross-checking of the retrieved financial data for these banks was not 
possible.  
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Conclusions 
In this work was attempted a testing and evaluation of the strength and the 
effectiveness of Altman’s Z-score model in predicting financial distress in the 
European banking sector. Following the specifications of the Altman’s Z-score model, 
the testing sample was consisted of two groups. The first included “failed” banks from 
countries that faced huge economic problems in the period of financial crisis (2006-
2016). The second was comprised of large banks from Central Europe which are still 
active. 
The estimated results of the “failed” group were 100% confirmed which is indicating 
that Altman’s Z-score model might be an effective indicator of financial distress 2 
years prior to a known “failure” event. However, some drawbacks of the specialized 
model for firms from emerging markets were revealed too. Actually, the results 
achieved from the financial data processing of the “non-failed” group (still active CE 
banks) made discernible a significant limitation. More specifically, the calculated Z-
scores of this group were low and indicated that 12 banks might possibly be 
threatened by direct financial distress in the next years, 7 banks are placed in the grey 
zone signaling concerns about their financial situation and only two were in the “safe” 
zone. The problem is caused form the fact that liquidity ratio (X1 model’s variable), 
in most cases, was negative something that affected directly the final outcome of Z-
score and respectively the characterization of the financial health of the banks 
examined. It seems that the accuracy and predictability of the tested Altman model, 
specialized for emerging markets, is questionable as regards predictions for private 
firms with high leverage. 
Shumway (1999) proved that the Z-score model is dead and totally not trustworthy 
anymore about use on predicting corporate bankruptcy. He claimed that half of 
Altman variables have poor predictive strength. Therefore, he proposed a model with 
market-driven variables and two accounting ratios. According to Shumway (1999) 
this was considered as more accurate in out-of-sample tests than Altman’s Z-score 
model. Chava & Jarrow (2004) validated the superiority of Shumway’s model against 
Altman’s Z-score model by confirming the crucial element of introducing industry 
effects in the hazard rate models. 
32 
Based on the findings of this work, one may claim that Altman’s Z-score model, 
specialized for firms from emerging markets, is somehow outdated and has to be 
handled in a very cautious way, especially in predictions concerning banking sector 
organisations. Further improvement of the Altman’s Z-score model is needed in order 
to be a trustworthy prediction tool for private firms (banks) operating with high 
leverage. Perhaps, Altman will soon provide us with one more Z-score formula which 
will be more appropriate for use with banks/financial institutions. This will be a new 
research challenge for finance researchers.   
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